Govt broadens rules that bar retired officials from publishing sensitive information
New Delhi, Jun 2: The Centre has amended its rules barring officers who had worked in intelligence and security related organisations from publishing sensitive information by adding new clauses, including the conditions that they can't share any material on "domain of the organisation" or its personnel.
The Central Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules, 2021, dated May 31 and notified late Tuesday, also states that they need to take prior permission from the "head of the organization" for publishing such material. In the earlier 2007 rules, permission was to be taken from the head of the department.
Twenty-five organisations, including the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) as well as the Special Protection Group (SPG) and the Border Security Force (BSF), are covered under the rules.
All employees would have to give an undertaking to the head of organisation that they would not publish sensitive information, failing which their pension can be "withheld or withdrawn", the amendment states.
According to the Central Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules 2007 that was notified in March 2008, the employees are already barred from publishing any sensitive information, "the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India".
The amended provision now reads, No government servant, who, having worked in any intelligence or security-related organization shall, without prior clearance from the head of the organisation, make any publication after retirement, of any material relating to and including domain of the organisation, including any reference or information about any personnel and his designation, and expertise or knowledge gained by virtue of working in that organization .
There was no mention of domain of the organisation and reference to any personnel in the 2007 rules.
"Domain may be taken to mean core area or core areas of the working of an organisation," an official explained.
The amended rules specify that they cover government servants who have worked in any Intelligence or Security-related organisation included in the Second Schedule of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (22 of 2005) .
When the RTI Act was incorporated in 2005, 18 organisations were in Schedule two and their details could not be subjected to the transparency law. From 2008 to 2011, the number rose to 25 after the inclusion of the elite SPG guarding the prime minister, the CBI, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Allaying fears expressed in some sections of the media, government sources said the intention of the government is always to safeguard national interests .
"An erroneous and misleading narrative is sought to be created with regard to the rules, which were designed to remove any confusion regarding existing restrictions on the subject," they said.
The sources added that a few intelligence and government officials who had worked in intelligence or security-related organisations had in the past publicly expressed themselves by means of writing or speaking, revealing specific knowledge and sensitive information gained by virtue of having worked in that organisation .
Stating that the order was issued to bring clarity on the issue, the sources said, "By no means do these rules deny any such former official from expressing his/her views. In fact, it makes it easier for them to do so, given that they can now contact the Head of their former employer organisation and seek clarification on whether the proposed material is sensitive or non-sensitive."
The 2007 rules had barred employees from publishing material including "sensitive information, the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the state, or relation with a foreign state or which would lead to incitement of an offence" after their retirement.
The rules apply to employees who retire from the IB, RAW, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Aviation Research Centre, BSF, Central Reserve Police Force, National Security Guards, Central Industrial Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police among others.
The list also includes the Narcotics Control Bureau, Special Frontier Force, Special Protection Group and Financial Intelligence Unit.
The CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, which have been amended to make way for 2007 and 2021 rules, however, don't apply to officers of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS) and Indian Forest Service (IFoS) among others.
The CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 apply to those appointed on or before December 31, 2003.
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Ballari violence: Were cops made scapegoats to cover political failure?
Bengaluru: Across Karnataka, a serious discussion has begun after the violence in Ballari and the swift action taken against police officers who were on the ground that day. The core question being asked is simple: when law and order fails, why are police officers the first to be shown the door, while political responsibility is quietly pushed aside?
The January 1 clash in Ballari was not a sudden street fight. It was a political confrontation involving supporters of two sitting MLAs. A banner related to the unveiling of a Valmiki statue became the flashpoint. What followed was stone-pelting, firing, and the death of a Congress worker. The situation spiralled within hours.
Within a day, Ballari SP Pavan Nejjur was suspended. Soon after, senior officers were reshuffled. Deputy Inspector General of Police Vartika Katiyar was transferred. No official reason was cited in the notification. But the timing made one thing clear: accountability, at least on paper, had been fixed.
Since then, there has been unease within police circles and political debate outside it.
Unconfirmed reports that Nejjur attempted suicide after his suspension were firmly denied by senior officers and the home minister. They said he was safe, resting, and under stress. Still, the very fact that such reports gained traction says something about the pressure officers feel when action is taken overnight, without public clarity.
Opposition leaders have called Nejjur a scapegoat, pointing out that he had taken charge only hours before the violence. They have asked how an officer can be blamed for a political clash he barely had time to assess. They have also drawn parallels with earlier incidents where police leadership was suspended after tragedies, while political decision-making remained untouched.
However, responding to this criticism, Home Minister G Parameshwara rejected the argument that the suspension was unfair because Nejjur had assumed charge only hours earlier. “It is not important whether he reported to duty on the same day (of incident) or one hour back. Duty is duty. He is not new to the department. IPS officers are trained to handle such situations any time. If he had acted swiftly and promptly, he could have prevented the situation from escalating.” He had said adding that Nejjur did not discharge his duties properly and that this was the reason for his suspension.
Now, fresh and unconfirmed reports suggest that Vartika Katiyar may have met a senior cabinet minister, questioning why she was made to pay the price for a situation that was political in nature. There is no official confirmation of this meeting. But the talk itself has added fuel to the debate.
What is being discussed in the state is not whether the police made mistakes. Many acknowledge that the situation on January 1 was mishandled. A clash earlier in the day was allowed to cool down without strong preventive action. Later, a banner came up near a politically sensitive location. The crowd should not have been allowed to build up. Better anticipation was needed.
At the same time, critics are asking whether the entire burden can be placed on officers when the trigger itself was political rivalry. Who installed the banner? Who mobilised supporters? Who had armed private gunmen present at the spot? These are questions that are still part of the investigation, yet administrative punishment moved faster than political accountability.
This has led to a wider comparison with past incidents, including the Bengaluru stampede after the RCB victory celebrations. There too, police officers were suspended after lives were lost, while decisions taken at higher levels were defended as unavoidable. Many are now saying Ballari fits into the same pattern.
The argument being made is not that the police are blameless. The argument is that responsibility appears to stop at the uniform. When things go wrong, officers are transferred or suspended to send a message. But when the violence is rooted in political rivalry, that message feels incomplete.
Within police ranks, there is also quiet concern about working conditions. Officers say they are expected to manage volatile political situations overnight, often with little room to push back against powerful interests. When things hold, they are invisible. When they collapse, they stand alone.
The Ballari episode has once again exposed this fault line.
For the government, the challenge is larger than one suspension or transfer. The real test is whether it is willing to publicly acknowledge political failures when law and order breaks down, instead of letting the system suggest that the police alone dropped the ball.
For now, what remains is a growing feeling across Karnataka that accountability is selective. And that whenever politics turns violent, the easiest answer is to change the officers, not the decisions that led to the violence in the first place.
