New Delhi (PTI): The Supreme Court on Friday refused to accept the request of Solicitor General Tushar Mehta that chief secretaries of states, except West Bengal and Telangana, be allowed to appear virtually before the court on November 3 in the stray dogs case.

Mehta mentioned the matter before a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, which made it clear that the chief secretaries will have to appear physically before the court on November 3.

"When we require them to come and file compliance affidavit, they are just sleeping over it. No respect for the order of the court. Then alright, Let them come," Justice Nath said.

Mehta urged the bench that instead of appearing physically, the chief secretaries be allowed to appear before the court virtually.

While hearing the stray dogs matter on October 27, the top court had directed the chief secretaries of all the states, except West Bengal and Telangana, to remain present before it on November 3 to explain why compliance affidavits were not filed despite the court's August 22 order.

On August 22, the apex court expanded the scope of the stray dogs case beyond the confines of Delhi-National Capital Region, and directed that all states and UTs be made parties in the matter.

It had directed the municipal authorities to file an affidavit of compliance with complete statistics of resources like dog pounds, veterinarians, dog-catching personnel, and specially-modified vehicles and cages available as on date for the purpose of compliance of the Animal Birth Control (ABC) Rules.

The bench had also impleaded the states and UTs in the matter while observing that application of ABC Rules was uniform all over India.

The apex court is hearing a suo motu case which was initiated on July 28 over a media report on stray dog bites leading to rabies, particularly among children, in the national capital.

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Judge cites denial of home to Muslim girl, opposition to Dalit women cooking mid-day meals

Hyderabad, February 23, 2026: Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan has said that despite repeated affirmations of constitutional morality by courts, deep societal faultlines rooted in caste and religious discrimination continue to shape everyday realities in India.

Speaking at a seminar on “Constitutional Morality and the Role of District Judiciary” organised by the Telangana Judges Association and the Telangana State Judicial Academy in Hyderabad, Justice Bhuyan reflected on the gap between constitutional ideals and social practices.

He cited a recent instance involving his daughter’s friend, a PhD scholar at a private university in Noida, who was denied accommodation in South Delhi after her surname revealed her Muslim identity. According to Justice Bhuyan, the landlady bluntly informed her that no accommodation was available once her religious background became known.

In another example from Odisha, he referred to resistance by some parents to the government’s mid-day meal programme because the food was prepared by Dalit women employed as cooks. He noted that some parents had objected aggressively and refused to allow their children to consume meals cooked by members of the Scheduled Caste community.

Describing these incidents as “the tip of the iceberg,” Justice Bhuyan said they reveal how far society remains from the benchmark of constitutional morality even 75 years into the Republic. He observed that while the Constitution lays down standards of equality and dignity, the morality practised within homes and communities often diverges sharply from those values.

He emphasised that constitutional morality requires governance through the rule of law rather than the rule of popular opinion. Referring to the evolution of the doctrine through judicial decisions, he cited Naz Foundation v Union of India, in which the Delhi High Court read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that popular morality cannot restrict fundamental rights under Article 21. Though the judgment was later overturned in Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation, the Supreme Court ultimately restored and expanded the principle in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, affirming that constitutional morality must prevail over majoritarian views.

“In our constitutional scheme, it is the constitutionality of the issue before the court that is relevant, not the dominant or popular view,” he said.

Justice Bhuyan also addressed the functioning of the district judiciary, underlining that trial courts are the first point of contact for most litigants and form the foundation of the justice delivery system. He stressed that due importance must be given to the recording of evidence and adjudication of bail matters.

Highlighting the role of High Courts, he said their supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended as a shield to correct grave jurisdictional errors, not as a mechanism to substitute the discretion or factual appreciation of trial judges.

He recalled that several distinguished judges, including Justice H R Khanna, Justice A M Ahmadi, and Justice Fathima Beevi, began their careers in the district judiciary.

On representation within the judicial system, Justice Bhuyan noted that Telangana has made significant strides in gender inclusion. Out of a sanctioned strength of 655 judicial officers in the Telangana Judicial Service, 478 are currently serving, of whom 283 are women, exceeding 50 per cent representation. He added that members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minority communities, and persons with disabilities are also represented in the state’s judiciary.

He observed that greater representation of women, marginalised communities, persons with disabilities, and sexual minorities would help make the judiciary more inclusive and reflective of India’s diversity. “The judiciary must represent all the colours of the rainbow and become a rainbow institution,” he said.

Justice Bhuyan also referred to the recent restoration by the Supreme Court of the requirement of a minimum three years of practice at the Bar for entry-level judicial posts. While acknowledging that the requirement ensures practical exposure, he cautioned that its impact on women aspirants, especially those from rural or small-town backgrounds facing social and financial constraints, would need to be carefully observed over time.

Concluding his address, he reiterated that the justice system must strive to bridge the gap between constitutional ideals and lived realities, ensuring that the rule of law remains paramount.