7 years' jail 'high' for offence of causing death by negligence, says parliamentary panel
New Delhi, Nov 12: A parliamentary committee has noted that the seven years' imprisonment prescribed in the proposed new criminal law for causing death by negligence is "high" and it should be reduced to five years.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, headed by BJP MP Brijlal, also observed that the 10-year jail suggested in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for those who cause death of a person by rash or negligent act and escape from the scene of the incident or fail to report the incident to police or a magistrate, needed to further be deliberated for whether the clause should be retained at all.
"The committee feels that the punishment provided under clause 104(1) is high as compared to the provision for the same offence under section 304A of IPC. The committee, therefore, recommends that the proposed punishment under clause 104(1) may be reduced from seven years to five years," the panel noted.
According to the Section 104 (1) of the BNS, whoever causes the death of any person by any rash or negligent act, not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term that may extend up to seven years, and shall also be liable to a fine.
For the same offence, the Indian Penal Code (304A) says: whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
The committee is of the view that the clause 104(2) of the BNS may be against the Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India which says "No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
According to the clause 104(2) of the BNS, whoever causes the death of any person by any rash or negligent act, not amounting to culpable homicide, and escapes from the scene of the incident or fails to report the incident to a police officer or magistrate soon after the incident, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description of a term which may extend up to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
The committee observed that the Supreme Court has widened the scope of the immunity given by the Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India by interpreting the word "witness" to include oral as well as documentary evidence so that no person can be compelled to be a witness to support a prosecution against himself.
"Hence, further contemplation is required, if the government still seeks to retain this new provision," the committee noted.
The committee also recommended that if this provision has to be retained, the government should limit the application of clause 104(2) of the BNS to motor vehicle accidents only.
In addition to that, the expression "or fails" should be replaced with "and fails" to provide for easier prosecution and less harsh punishment to a perpetrator who fulfils either of the duties mentioned in clause 104(2) of the BNS and the time period within which the perpetrator has to report the incident should be defined.
"In view of the above, the committee recommends re-drafting this clause in consultation with the Ministry of Law and Justice," it said.
The proposed laws are Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS-2023), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS-2023) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA-2023.
The three bills, which were introduced in the Lok Sabha on August 11, will replace the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Criminal Procedure Act, 1898, and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The report of the parliamentary committee was submitted to Rajya Sabha on Friday.
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Deep societal faultlines persist despite 75 years of independence: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Judge cites denial of home to Muslim girl, opposition to Dalit women cooking mid-day meals
Hyderabad, February 23, 2026: Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan has said that despite repeated affirmations of constitutional morality by courts, deep societal faultlines rooted in caste and religious discrimination continue to shape everyday realities in India.
Speaking at a seminar on “Constitutional Morality and the Role of District Judiciary” organised by the Telangana Judges Association and the Telangana State Judicial Academy in Hyderabad, Justice Bhuyan reflected on the gap between constitutional ideals and social practices.
He cited a recent instance involving his daughter’s friend, a PhD scholar at a private university in Noida, who was denied accommodation in South Delhi after her surname revealed her Muslim identity. According to Justice Bhuyan, the landlady bluntly informed her that no accommodation was available once her religious background became known.
In another example from Odisha, he referred to resistance by some parents to the government’s mid-day meal programme because the food was prepared by Dalit women employed as cooks. He noted that some parents had objected aggressively and refused to allow their children to consume meals cooked by members of the Scheduled Caste community.
Describing these incidents as “the tip of the iceberg,” Justice Bhuyan said they reveal how far society remains from the benchmark of constitutional morality even 75 years into the Republic. He observed that while the Constitution lays down standards of equality and dignity, the morality practised within homes and communities often diverges sharply from those values.
He emphasised that constitutional morality requires governance through the rule of law rather than the rule of popular opinion. Referring to the evolution of the doctrine through judicial decisions, he cited Naz Foundation v Union of India, in which the Delhi High Court read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that popular morality cannot restrict fundamental rights under Article 21. Though the judgment was later overturned in Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation, the Supreme Court ultimately restored and expanded the principle in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, affirming that constitutional morality must prevail over majoritarian views.
“In our constitutional scheme, it is the constitutionality of the issue before the court that is relevant, not the dominant or popular view,” he said.
Justice Bhuyan also addressed the functioning of the district judiciary, underlining that trial courts are the first point of contact for most litigants and form the foundation of the justice delivery system. He stressed that due importance must be given to the recording of evidence and adjudication of bail matters.
Highlighting the role of High Courts, he said their supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended as a shield to correct grave jurisdictional errors, not as a mechanism to substitute the discretion or factual appreciation of trial judges.
He recalled that several distinguished judges, including Justice H R Khanna, Justice A M Ahmadi, and Justice Fathima Beevi, began their careers in the district judiciary.
On representation within the judicial system, Justice Bhuyan noted that Telangana has made significant strides in gender inclusion. Out of a sanctioned strength of 655 judicial officers in the Telangana Judicial Service, 478 are currently serving, of whom 283 are women, exceeding 50 per cent representation. He added that members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minority communities, and persons with disabilities are also represented in the state’s judiciary.
He observed that greater representation of women, marginalised communities, persons with disabilities, and sexual minorities would help make the judiciary more inclusive and reflective of India’s diversity. “The judiciary must represent all the colours of the rainbow and become a rainbow institution,” he said.
Justice Bhuyan also referred to the recent restoration by the Supreme Court of the requirement of a minimum three years of practice at the Bar for entry-level judicial posts. While acknowledging that the requirement ensures practical exposure, he cautioned that its impact on women aspirants, especially those from rural or small-town backgrounds facing social and financial constraints, would need to be carefully observed over time.
Concluding his address, he reiterated that the justice system must strive to bridge the gap between constitutional ideals and lived realities, ensuring that the rule of law remains paramount.
