Merely threatening by claiming to be ISIS terrorist not offence under UAPA: Madras HC
Chennai: The Madras High Court, while granting bail to a man accused under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), emphasized that merely threatening a person by claiming association with ISIS is not sufficient to conclude that the person supported the terrorist organization. The court specified that such threats could constitute a separate offense but not under the UAPA.
A bench comprising Justice SS Sundar and Justice Sunder Mohan asserted that the prosecution needed to present independent evidence to establish support for a terrorist organization. The judges stated, "Merely because the appellant had threatened the person stating that he was associated with an ISIS terrorist, it would by itself not be a reasonable ground to hold that he had supported a terrorist organization. The threat would certainly amount to an offense but not an offense under Section 39 of the UA (P) Act."
The court further highlighted that the materials provided by the prosecution did not demonstrate an intention to support a terrorist organization. Instead, they showed that the appellant handled funds for the prime accused, which differed from supporting a terrorist organization. The judges pointed out that, for bail in cases involving conspiracy under the UAPA, it was essential to specify the exact terrorist act agreed upon.
"The allegation of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act must spell out the object of the conspiracy (i.e.) as to what exactly was the terrorist act that was agreed to be committed. However, we may hasten to add that the above observations are made only for arriving at a prima facie satisfaction for the purpose of considering the bail application on the basis of the broad probabilities of the case," the court explained.
The court heard an appeal filed by Mohamed Irfan challenging the denial of bail. Irfan, along with others, was found in a car intercepted by the police on information that it was carrying arms and weapons. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over the investigation, and the case was registered for offenses under the Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act. The government granted sanction to prosecute the accused under the UAPA.
According to the final report, the prime accused, along with Irfan, engaged in anti-national activities in the name of the Khilafah Party of India and Intellectual Students of India (ISI). The appellant allegedly participated in discussions about ISIS ideologies and promoting the Khilafah Party of India. Irfan argued that the final report was based on surmises and conjectures, contending that there was no material to charge him under the UAPA. He asserted that the prosecution could only establish his association with the prime accused, not the terrorist organization.
The prosecution countered that Irfan had threatened witnesses by claiming association with ISIS, creating a potential danger. The court noted that, while assessing a prima facie case, even a grave suspicion is sufficient to frame charges. However, when considering bail and the denial of liberty, a different test applies. The court stressed that the accusations must not only be grave but also supported by cogent materials.
Regarding the restrictions under Section 43D of the UAPA, the court clarified that the provision does not take away basic human or constitutional rights. The restriction implies that courts cannot grant bail without sufficient reasons, ensuring that bail is not a mere formality. The court granted bail to Irfan on conditions, emphasizing that pre-trial detention should not be indefinite.
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Deep societal faultlines persist despite 75 years of independence: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Judge cites denial of home to Muslim girl, opposition to Dalit women cooking mid-day meals
Hyderabad, February 23, 2026: Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan has said that despite repeated affirmations of constitutional morality by courts, deep societal faultlines rooted in caste and religious discrimination continue to shape everyday realities in India.
Speaking at a seminar on “Constitutional Morality and the Role of District Judiciary” organised by the Telangana Judges Association and the Telangana State Judicial Academy in Hyderabad, Justice Bhuyan reflected on the gap between constitutional ideals and social practices.
He cited a recent instance involving his daughter’s friend, a PhD scholar at a private university in Noida, who was denied accommodation in South Delhi after her surname revealed her Muslim identity. According to Justice Bhuyan, the landlady bluntly informed her that no accommodation was available once her religious background became known.
In another example from Odisha, he referred to resistance by some parents to the government’s mid-day meal programme because the food was prepared by Dalit women employed as cooks. He noted that some parents had objected aggressively and refused to allow their children to consume meals cooked by members of the Scheduled Caste community.
Describing these incidents as “the tip of the iceberg,” Justice Bhuyan said they reveal how far society remains from the benchmark of constitutional morality even 75 years into the Republic. He observed that while the Constitution lays down standards of equality and dignity, the morality practised within homes and communities often diverges sharply from those values.
He emphasised that constitutional morality requires governance through the rule of law rather than the rule of popular opinion. Referring to the evolution of the doctrine through judicial decisions, he cited Naz Foundation v Union of India, in which the Delhi High Court read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that popular morality cannot restrict fundamental rights under Article 21. Though the judgment was later overturned in Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation, the Supreme Court ultimately restored and expanded the principle in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, affirming that constitutional morality must prevail over majoritarian views.
“In our constitutional scheme, it is the constitutionality of the issue before the court that is relevant, not the dominant or popular view,” he said.
Justice Bhuyan also addressed the functioning of the district judiciary, underlining that trial courts are the first point of contact for most litigants and form the foundation of the justice delivery system. He stressed that due importance must be given to the recording of evidence and adjudication of bail matters.
Highlighting the role of High Courts, he said their supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended as a shield to correct grave jurisdictional errors, not as a mechanism to substitute the discretion or factual appreciation of trial judges.
He recalled that several distinguished judges, including Justice H R Khanna, Justice A M Ahmadi, and Justice Fathima Beevi, began their careers in the district judiciary.
On representation within the judicial system, Justice Bhuyan noted that Telangana has made significant strides in gender inclusion. Out of a sanctioned strength of 655 judicial officers in the Telangana Judicial Service, 478 are currently serving, of whom 283 are women, exceeding 50 per cent representation. He added that members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minority communities, and persons with disabilities are also represented in the state’s judiciary.
He observed that greater representation of women, marginalised communities, persons with disabilities, and sexual minorities would help make the judiciary more inclusive and reflective of India’s diversity. “The judiciary must represent all the colours of the rainbow and become a rainbow institution,” he said.
Justice Bhuyan also referred to the recent restoration by the Supreme Court of the requirement of a minimum three years of practice at the Bar for entry-level judicial posts. While acknowledging that the requirement ensures practical exposure, he cautioned that its impact on women aspirants, especially those from rural or small-town backgrounds facing social and financial constraints, would need to be carefully observed over time.
Concluding his address, he reiterated that the justice system must strive to bridge the gap between constitutional ideals and lived realities, ensuring that the rule of law remains paramount.
